

FORUM: Security Council

QUESTION OF: Re-evaluating the international prevention and response mechanisms to Coups D'Etat

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INTRODUCTION

Coups d'état, conceived of very often as a shock to the political order, have been among some of the most critical difficulties to global stability and democratic governance for quite some time, with the first coup occurrence largely considered to be Napoleon's seizure of power in 1799¹. This kind of abrupt, mostly violent overthrow of a government does not destabilize only the nation's central government, but it ripples through the regions, fueling conflicts and human rights violations, undermining international peace efforts. As surges in coups have swept global events—from Africa to Southeast Asia—in recent decades, it has only underlined the fragility of state institutions and consistent vulnerabilities in global governance mechanisms designed to avert such crises.

As the world wrestles with these challenges, the theme of this year's conference —"Ethos vs. Progress: Reassessing Values in a Fragile World"— calls for an appraisal of the ethical underpinnings that hold together international responses to coups. This question, as straightforward as it may be, reminds us of something that at times is a less strident push toward stability and progress, overshadowing the moral imperatives of justice, human rights, and democratic governance. In a world where the line gets blurred between maintaining order and compromising on core values, how must the international community act in response to coups? Has there ever been more need to redefine progress in a context where the traditional structures of democracy simply will not work, or must one focus on restoring democratic institutions at whatever cost?

The topic wants us to delve into the depths of ethical dimensions that this global intervention package brings in the wake of coups. This means we should question whether the mechanisms of prevention and response currently in place are supportive of values like fairness, sovereignty, and human dignity, or is just another way to perpetuate cycles of instability by moving priorities away from political expediency to real progress. We see, in the complexities of this very

¹ "Coup D'état." *Merriam-Webster*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coup%20d%27%C3%A9tat>.

issue, how the way forward does not lie in revisiting strategies but quite fundamentally in reviewing values guiding our actions in a progressively fragile world.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Coups d'État

A coup d'état² refers to the sudden and mostly violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government by a small group, most often military - or other forces- based. Seizure of power normally skips due process of law and is mostly directed toward replacing the incumbent leadership to set up a new power without the consent of those ruled.

Military Coup

A military coup³ is one where the armed forces or part take over the running of the state, normally by the use of force, overthrowing the existing civilian leadership. It is dubbed a type of coups where the military takes center stage in both execution and consolidation after takeover.

Civilian Coup

A civilian coup is a situation where civilian leaders or factions assume power from the legitimate government, possibly with support from political allies or external forces. Unlike military coups, takeovers might only include manipulations of legal frameworks, electoral processes, or other non-military means of taking control over the state.

Hybrid Coup

Hybrid coup is a kind of coup d'état that takes elements from both military and civilian coups, probably in the form of cooperation between military leaders and political civilians or powerful groups that are aimed at overthrowing an existing government. This type of coup in most cases will feature the use of force alongside the manipulation of political or judicial systems.

² "Military Coup." *Collins English Dictionary*,
<https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/military-coup>.

³ "Democratic Governance." *USAID*,
<https://www.usaid.gov/democracy#:~:text=Democratic%20Governance%20%E2%80%93%20Building%20open%2C%20responsive,how%20they%20will%20be%20governed>.

Democratic Governance

Democratic governance⁴ is a form of government wherein people either directly or through elected representatives have the power. It is only free and fair elections, rule of law, respect for human rights, and participation in political activities by all citizens that characterize democratic governance. Democratic governance is founded on principles of transparency, accountability, and respect for constitutional procedures.

Sanctions

Sanctions⁵ are measures adopted to restrict, by countries, international organizations, or even alliances in response to certain acts or policies of a state or group. There could be economic penalties that include trade embargoes or financial asset freezes. Also, some diplomatic measures involve travel bans or suspension of diplomatic relations. The coercion of the entity to which they are applied is meant to alter its behavior in changing the policy into conformance with international norms.

Diplomatic Engagement

Diplomatic engagement⁶ is the use of diplomatic channels and negotiations in the management of international relationships, resolutions of disputes, or influence of the behavior of other states. Dialogue and negotiation are the hallmarks of diplomacy that find expression in treaty-making and representation through ambassadors or other envoys for communication and intercession between governments.

Preventive Diplomacy

The acts of diplomacy executed with an intention to stop the conflicts from arising or prevent the expansion of a dispute into a full-blown conflict are described as preventive diplomacy⁷. This encompasses monitoring activity, by the use of early intervention, negotiation, and mediation to solve the root causes of tension before they degenerate into actual violence or instability.

⁴ "What Are Sanctions?" *Government of Sweden*, <https://www.government.se/government-policy/foreign-and-security-policy/international-sanctions/what-are-sanctions/>.

⁵ "What Are Sanctions?" *Government of Sweden*, <https://www.government.se/government-policy/foreign-and-security-policy/international-sanctions/what-are-sanctions/>.

⁶ Arend, Anthony C. "Chapter 8: International Law and Collective Security." *Brill*, <https://brill.com/previewpdf/book/9789004394254/BP000010.xml>.

⁷ "Preventive Diplomacy." *Spain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.exteriores.gob.es/en/PoliticaExterior/Paginas/DiplomaciaPreventiva.aspx#:~:text=Preventive%20Diplomacy%20includes%20all%20measures,if%20they%20occur%2C%20from%20spreading>

Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations⁸ are missions authorized by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict. Most often, this will involve international military and civilian personnel deployment with a view to monitoring ceasefires, protecting civilians, and supporting the implementation of a peace agreement.

Mediation

Mediation⁹ is a process in which a neutral third party facilitates negotiation between the disputing parties over a given conflict and helps them reach some mutual agreement. The mediators do not impose the solution but assist the parties in finding common ground and resolve the differences peacefully.

Human Rights Abuses

Human rights violations¹⁰ are basically violations of the basic rights and freedoms due to every person, including the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of expression, and a fair trial. Abuses can emanate from state actors, like governments or security forces, and non-state actors, for example, insurgent groups or corporations.

Transitional Government

A transitional government¹¹ refers to one which is set up temporarily to administrate the country during its transition, usually following a coup, civil conflict, or following the collapse of the previous regime. The restoration of stability, rebuilding institutions, and overseeing the process of returning to constitutional and democratic governance usually form the main line of activity for any transitional government.

Collective Action

Collective action¹² refers to coordinated activity of many states or organizations in solving some common problem or achieving some common objective. In the language of international relations, it very frequently takes on the shape of multilateral initiatives, such as sanctions,

⁸ "United Nations Peacekeeping." *United Nations*, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>.

⁹ "What Is Mediation?" *U.S. Department of Commerce*, <https://www.commerce.gov/cr/reports-and-resources/eo-mediation-guide/what-mediation#:~:text=Mediation%20involves%20the%20intervention%20of,explore%20a%20variety%20of%20solutions>.

¹⁰ "What Are Human Rights Violations?" *Human Rights Careers*, <https://www.humanrightscareers.com/issues/what-are-human-rights-violations/#:~:text=Civil%20and%20political%20rights%20are,known%20as%20a%20war%20crime>.

¹¹ "Transitional Government." *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, <https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/transitional-government>.

¹² "Collective Action Problem." *Encyclopædia Britannica*, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/collective-action-problem-1917157>.

peacekeeping missions, and diplomatic interventions, undertaken by coalitions/alliances to respond to global challenges.

Information Sharing

Information sharing¹³ is an interchange of data, intelligence, and knowledge between states, international organizations, and other stakeholders. Effective sharing of information in a manner that coordinates responses to global challenges, like coups, terrorism, or human rights abuses, is a vital way of facilitating informed decision-making and furthering cooperation.

Uniform International Response

An integrated international response¹⁴ is representative of well-coordinated and coherent efforts by the global community, states, international organizations, and non-governmental actors in the addressing of an issue or crisis. The approach ensures consistency and mutual reinforcement among acts carried out, thus standing a greater chance of realization—for instance, returning democratic governance or preventing further instability after a coup.

Ethnic Power

Ethnic power¹⁵ refers to the degree of influence and control a particular ethnic group wields over others within a society, especially with respect to political representation, economic dominance, and cultural control. Such power may take its toll on resource distribution, decision-making processes, or even dealing with other groups within a country or region.

Blockchain Technology

Blockchain technology¹⁶ is a form of a decentralized and distributed ledger mechanism for capturing transactions across multiple computers in a form that effectively allows for security, transparency, and immutability of the data. The result is tamper-resistant and verifiable data without the need for a central authority.

¹³ "Integration Information Sharing in Government." *IGI Global*, https://www.igi-global.com/dictionary/integration-information-sharing-government/14501#google_vignette.

¹⁴ "Millennium Ecosystem Assessment." *Millennium Assessment*, <https://millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.320.aspx.pdf>.

¹⁵ Lijphart, Arend. "Ethnic Power Sharing: Three Big Problems." *Journal of Democracy*, <https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/ethnic-power-sharing-three-big-problems/>.

¹⁶ "Blockchain." Investopedia, <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp>. Accessed 10 Sept. 2024.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Historical Context

The term "coup d'état" comes from French; meaning "blow of state"¹⁷ and describes the illegal seizing of power due to a small initiated group, usually a circle or leadership of the military or political elite. The first ever recorded military coup was in about 2334 BCE, when Sargon of Akkad—a high-ranking official—overthrew King Ur-Zababa of Kish in ancient Mesopotamia and established the Akkadian Empire¹⁸. It set a historical precedent for the use of armed forces to capture power.

The frequency and nature of coups changed significantly throughout the 19th and 20th centuries¹⁹, driven partly by nationalism and colonialism and by the emergence of new nation-states, most notably through the dissolution of empires and decolonization following World War II²⁰. This resulted in a trend in newly independent nations, especially in Africa and Asia, often experiencing political instability, economic challenges, and ethnic tensions, leading to frequent military interventions under the guise of restoring order²¹.

Coups are a product of weak democratic institutions, widespread economic instability, and external interference²². These are the preconditions for seizures of power through force that can have devastating effects on the political and social fabric of a nation. Weak rule of law, limited checks and balances, and poor protection for liberty open the vacuum to be exploited by ambitious leaders. This underlines the need for learning from history to avert coups.

In current years military expenditure has a significant impact on the frequency of coups. According to Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, a British and German economist respectively, nations spending large portions of their GDP on the military are more likely to suffer coups because of this

¹⁷ "Coup D'état." *Lawless French*, <https://www.lawlessfrench.com/expressions/coup-detat/>.

¹⁸ Cartwright, Mark. "Sargon of Akkad." *World History Encyclopedia*, https://www.worldhistory.org/Sargon_of_Akkad/.

¹⁹ "Coup D'état Project." *Cline Center for Advanced Social Research*, <https://clinecenter.illinois.edu/project/research-themes/democracy-and-development/coup-detat-project/freq-table>.

²⁰ Mian, Atif R., et al. "Paper." *International Monetary Fund*, <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2024/034/article-A001-en.xml>.

²¹ Adebajo, Adekeye. "Why All the Coups?" *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00219096231224680?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.5>.

²² Belkin, Aaron, and Evan Schofer. "To Coup or Not to Coup: The Cold War Hangover of U.S. Security Assistance." *Irregular Warfare Initiative*, <https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/to-coup-or-not-to-coup-the-cold-war-hangover-of-us-security-assistance/>.

spending. The military becomes powerful and autonomous, having greater political ambitions. The study established that a 1% rise in military spending as a proportion of GDP increases the risk of an occurrence of a coup by about 5%²³. More specifically, this relation seems more intense in states that have institutions of weak democratic inclination, where it is often felt that the military institution is the most organized and strong to take over during such periods of political turmoil or economic crisis.

While the same can be said for the whole world, closing in specifically on developing nations makes it evident that the era of the Cold War (1947-1991) had a drastic effect on the rise of coups²⁴. Local conflicts had often been turned into proxy wars as the ideological rivalry between the United States (U.S) and the Soviet Union caused each superpower to support or oppose coups based on their strategic interests²⁵. This often led to the destabilization of governments. One particular example was the U.S.-backed 1973 coup against Chile²⁶, where General Pinochet overthrew President Allende. This example highlights how external powers could exploit internal divisions, resulting in prolonged instability.

²³ *Coup Traps: Why Does Africa Have so Many Coups d'etat?*, ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:49097086-8505-4eb2-8174-314ce1aa3ebb/files/m2b281be998f3d803abc8b39ed3dca1ec

²⁴ Belkin, Aaron, and Evan Schofer. "To Coup or Not to Coup: The Cold War Hangover of U.S. Security Assistance." *Irregular Warfare Initiative*, <https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/to-coup-or-not-to-coup-the-cold-war-hangover-of-us-security-assistance/>.

²⁵ "Two Superpowers: The United States and the Soviet Union." *Study.com*, <https://study.com/academy/lesson/two-super-powers-the-united-states-and-the-soviet-union.html>.

²⁶ "Chile Coup Timeline." Zinn Education Project, <https://www.zinnedproject.org/materials/chile-coup-timeline/>.




Figure 1: A depiction of all 236 successful, and 239 attempted coups world wide since the 1950-2016, where the people's democratic republic of yemen, and the yemen arab republic are considered as one entry.²⁷




Figure 2: A graph depicting the changes in global annual military spending between 2001-2023²⁸

²⁷ Tharoor, Ishaan. "Map: The World of Coups Since 1950." *The Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/22/map-the-world-of-coups-since-1950/>.

²⁸ "Global Military Spending Trends." *Statista*, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/264434/trend-of-global-military-spending/>.

International Law and Norms

The Charter of the United Nations

The UN Charter, and in particular Article 2(4)²⁹, is a cornerstone in international law concerning coups³⁰. Article 2(4) explicitly denounces the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Such a concept underpins the global stance against unlawful seizures of power by entrenching that changes at the level of government should come about through legal and peaceful means. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is empowered to take action³¹, including imposing sanctions or authorizing military interventions, in cases where a coup constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

Adopted in 1948, the UDHR³² spells out the most basic human rights, including the right to participate in government and free elections. Though not legally binding, it has been an important normative instrument to this day in support of democratic governance and in condemnation of unconstitutional seizures of power. A coup event normally suppresses such rights, amounting to immediate international condemnation and justifying actions by the international community geared toward restoring democratic governance³³.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

Adopted in 1976, the ICCPR³⁴ binds the signatory countries to ensure that every person within their respective territories enjoys or has civil and political rights. This is in relation to the right of self-determination and participation in public affairs. In most cases, coups tend to violate such rights, as they undermine the legal and democratic processes through which citizens choose their leaders. It provides a legal basis for international criticism and action against such regimes, especially when they commit human rights abuses.

Principle of Non-Recognition of Illegitimate Governments

²⁹ "United Nations Charter." *United Nations*, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>.

³⁰ Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. "Paper." *SSRN*, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2321806.

³¹ "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council." *United Nations Security Council*, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/repertoire/actions#:~:text=It%20allows%20the%20Council%20to,restore%20international%20peace%20and%20security%22>.

³² "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." *United Nations*, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

³³ "Human Rights Violations in Honduras." *Inter-American Commission on Human Rights*, <https://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Honduras09eng/Chap.6.htm>.

³⁴ "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." *Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>.

The principle of non-recognition of illegitimate governments³⁵ ensures that the international community does not recognize governments rising to power through unconstitutional means. The principle is often backed by UN resolutions and statements by international organizations. The essence of non-recognition is to deprive the coup leaders of any form of legitimacy by closing the avenue through which they may seek international legitimacy. This move is aimed at forcing the regime instituted by the coup to reinstate constitutional order and may be complemented by measures such as diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

In case coups involve an armed conflict, the situations become subject to International Humanitarian Law³⁶. IHL, in particular the Geneva Conventions³⁷, governs the conduct of hostilities and protects those who are not participating in the conflict including civilians. Coup violence is routinely characterized by violations of IHL, which include unlawful killings and detentions among other abuses. Individual perpetrators may be brought before international justice, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC)³⁸, which further solidifies the norm that, even at the height of political turmoil and instability, basic human rights and international law are unbreachable.

Role of the African Union (AU)

The African Union has been at the forefront in the fight to curb coups d'état on the African continent, where the rate at which they have been happening has been alarmingly high³⁹. The AU was established in 2001 as a successor to the Organization of African Unity, with an expanded mandate, among others, for the promotion of peace, security, and democracy in Africa. Entailed therein is a clear posture against unconstitutional changes of government.

African Union Constitutive Act

³⁵ Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. "Authoritarianism and Democracy." *Oxford Academic*, <https://academic.oup.com/book/3052/chapter-abstract/143801654?redirectedFrom=fulltext>.

³⁶ "International Humanitarian Law." *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/humanitarian-aid/international-humanitarian-law_en#:~:text=Related%20information-,What%20is%20it%3Fgroups%20during%20an%20armed%20conflict.

³⁷ "Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols." *Legal Information Institute, Cornell University*, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/geneva_conventions_and_their_additional_protocols#:~:text=The%20Geneva%20Conventions%20are%20a,%22.

³⁸ "International Criminal Court." *International Criminal Court*, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/>.

³⁹ "Constitutive Act of the African Union." *African Union*, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union⁴⁰, adopted in 2000, is the foundational document of the AU and marks a very clear departure from the founding principles of the OAU. Article 4(p)⁴¹, one of the most important provisions, unequivocally denounces and rejects unconstitutional change of government. This gives the African Union powers to suspend any Member State where a government has been toppled through force. This simple legal regime seeks to discourage military commanders and other power grabbers from allowing coups to take place outside constitutional channels. This clause is further underlined by the ability of the AU to execute the sanction and suspension quickly enough to demonstrate that the Union will not tolerate with illegal seizures of power both domestically and internationally.

Peace and Security Council (PSC)

The Peace and Security Council⁴² is the prime organ of the AU mandated to ensure the maintenance of continental peace and security, which, of course, encompasses addressing coups d'état. The PSC may authorize the use of sanctions, intervention within Member States, or even enforce peacekeeping missions for the restoration of constitutional order. The intervention of the PSC is very important since this offers a structured and timely response to crises, frustrating further destabilization. For example, after the 2021 coup in Mali, the PSC promptly suspended the country from the AU⁴³ and coordinated international efforts for the restoration of democracy. Such swiftness only underscored the ability of Africans to handle political crises while at the same time adhering to the AU's commitment to democratic governance.

Interventions and Mediation Efforts

Aside from the legal and institutional frameworks put in place by the AU, it has also played a very integral role in mediation and resolving conflicts resulting from coups. Many times, the AU acts neutrally, hence placing it in a good position to encourage diplomatic dialogue with rival groups to restore constitutional order peacefully. A case in point is in Sudan, following the 2019 coup, the Union, in conjunction with the United Nations, intervened and mediated negotiations that resulted in the establishment of a transitional government⁴⁴. The approach not only prevented further violence in Guinea but also set a precedent on how the AU can support the stabilization of post-coup environments.

⁴⁰ "Constitutive Act of the African Union." *African Union*, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.

⁴¹ "Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union." *African Union*, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/35423-treaty-0025_-_PROTOCOL_ON_THE_AMENDMENTS_TO_THE_CONSTITUTIVE_ACT_OF_THE_AFRICAN_UNION_E.pdf.

⁴² "Peace and Security Council of the African Union." *African Union*, <https://au.int/en/psc>.

⁴³ "Mali's Suspension from African Union." *African Union*, <https://au.int/en/articles/african-union-suspends-mali-participation-all-activities>.

⁴⁴ "UN Press Release on Mali." *United Nations*, <https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13929.doc.htm>.

Role of the UN Security Council (UNSC)

It is in the area of enforcing international peace and security that the UNSC plays a major role as it is the only organ within the UN empowered to impose sanctions, authorize military interventions, and establish peacekeeping missions in response to coups d'état. Hence, its involvement in addressing coups is very important in the restoration of stability and reaffirmation of international norms.

Authorization of peace-keeping missions

The UNSC responds to coups through the authorization of peace-keeping missions, one of the most important methods. Most often, such missions are dispatched in post-coup settings whereby further violence, instability, or even humanitarian crises might occur. For instance, the UNSC's authorisation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2004⁴⁵ after the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide expresses this clearly. The MINUSTAH played an important role in the stabilization of Haiti and helped restore political order, while also supporting humanitarian efforts. This example therefore illustrates the UNSC's ability to directly intervene and help in the re-establishment of constitutional governance following a coup.

Imposition of Sanctions

The UNSC is mandated to impose targeted sanctions⁴⁶ against individuals, entities, or states involved in coups d'état. Such sanctions include travel bans, asset freezes, and arms embargoes. These measures are designed to isolate the coup leaders, cut them off from their resources, and ultimately compel them to relinquish power and reinstate democratic rule. Although they are not a military tool, sanctions can prove to be very effective in delegitimizing coup leaders by limiting their ability to maintain control.

Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation

The UNSC frequently cooperates with other UN organizations or regional bodies in efforts aimed at organizing mediation and opening communication between parties in disagreement within post-coup situations. Such support from the UNSC provides international legitimacy to the mediation process and sometimes serves as the turning point toward peaceful resolution.

Upholding International Law and Norms

Another core function of the UNSC is to uphold international law and norms, particularly that enshrined in the UN Charter. Article 2(4) of the Charter enjoins all members to "refrain in their

⁴⁵ "UN Press Release on Cote d'Ivoire." *United Nations*, <https://press.un.org/en/2004/sc8083.doc.htm>.

⁴⁶ "Sanctions Information." *United Nations*, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/information>.

international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,⁴⁷ which coups clearly violate. One of the UNSC roles is to reinforce this norm through condemnation of coups and a call for the restoration of constitutional order. The UNSC reaction to various coups, as illustrated by the cases of Mali in 2012⁴⁸ and that of Côte d'Ivoire in 2002⁴⁹, in which the organization called for the restoration of democratically elected governments, shows how serious the institution has been in adhering to this principle.

Challenges and Limitations

The political dynamics within the Council may reduce effectiveness, particularly differences between the five permanent members bearing the veto power. That is due to the fact P5 interests can delay or even prevent the Council from acting. Secondly, it is always dependent on its Member States for the implementation of resolutions passed. This limits its effectiveness on imposed sanctions or interventions. Despite these challenges, the UNSC remains a core actor in the global response to coups, using its unique authority to advance stability and democratic governance.

Current Prevention Mechanisms

Early warning systems

Early warning systems are in place to detect signs of political instability, heading off escalation into crises such as coups. One such system is the Global Conflict Risk Index of the European Commission, which supervises economic conditions, social unrest, and governance as a way to gauge conflict risks. While it has managed to point out general trends, sometimes it may miss coup triggers. Recent improvements include real-time data and artificial intelligence to make this more accurate.

Preventive diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy deals with the very cause of potential coups by solving political fractures before they develop into instability. For instance, in 2019, in Sudan⁵⁰, the UN was very instrumental and was negotiating the transition after President Omar al-Bashir's ouster. This approach could promote stability, provided there is a clearly stated political pathway and a united

⁴⁷ "UN Security Council Resolution 2100." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2100\(2013\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2100(2013)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁴⁸ Five Things to Know about Mali's Coup." *United States Institute of Peace*, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/five-things-know-about-malis-coup>.

⁴⁹ "Child Soldiers in Congo." *Human Rights Watch*, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/cdi0508/6.htm#:~:text=On%20September%2019%2C%202002%2C%20reels,northern%20towns%20of%20Bouak%C3%A9%20and>.

⁵⁰ "UN Press Release on Africa." *United Nations*, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/04/1136187>.

international supporting it. These efforts could be further advanced by conflict resolution training for diplomats, broadening the circle of the dialogue participants, and using technology to ensure inclusivity in discussions.

Strengthening democratic institutions

Strengthening democratic institutions would be an important way to prevent coups d'état by supplying a stable and resilient political environment. Strong democratic institutions—an independent judiciary, free press, robust electoral systems, and active civil society—would mean peaceful transitions in power and according to established legal frameworks. It is in these institutions that accountability, transparency, and rule of law are fostered, reducing the possibility of a power grab, be it attempted or successful, by deterring potential coup plotters and offering clear and legitimate avenues for redressing grievances.

MAJOR COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED

United States of America (USA)

The United States of America is the most influential country in addressing coups through diplomatic, economic sanction, and sometimes military means. It influences as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to the UN resolutions that condemn the coups and unleash sanctions. The State Department is quick to denounce coups and often subjects coup leaders to targeted sanctions like asset freezes and travel bans. The U.S. may also indirectly back military interventions by simply coordinating with the other Western democracies and the European Union in an attempt to forge a common international response⁵¹.

France

Informed by historical links in West and Central Africa, France will largely react to coups through diplomatic engagement—though with military intervention where necessary—to ensure the restoration of constitutional order. It collaborates with regional organizations like ECOWAS⁵² and the African Union⁵³. France further capitalizes on its influence within the European Union to secure

⁵¹ "Fixing U.S. Policy Toward Foreign Military Coups." *Lawfare*, <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/fixing-u.s.-policy-toward-foreign-military-coups>.

⁵² "Niger Coup." *UK Ambassador to France*, <https://uk.ambafrance.org/France-rejects-accusations-by-Niger-coup-leaders>.

⁵³ Al Jazeera. "Blinken Offers Niger's Ousted Leader Bazoum 'Unflagging Support'." *Al Jazeera*, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/7/29/blinken-offers-nigers-ousted-leader-bazoum-unflagging-support>

appropriate sanction measures against such regimes and suspends assistance while emphasizing human rights and democratic governance⁵⁴.

Russia

The Russian policy has been that of non-interference on coups and other internal uprisings, seldom permitting itself the use of sanctions or even military actions as tools against offending regimes. Basically, Russia tends to protect and promote internal solutions without external interference as it is a UN Security Council member. However, Russia protects the government which supports its geopolitical interest, and even those that came into power as a result of coups, and offers military aid or security cooperation⁵⁵.

Brazil

Through the Organization of American States⁵⁶, Brazil stands out in coups fighters in Latin America. It projects itself as supportive of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and insists on collective actions in instances of unconstitutional power changes. Basically, Brazil's initiatives have been based on diplomacy and mediation with a view to finding political crisis solutions via agreements. It has also backed regional sanctions in a bid to mount pressure on coup leaders⁵⁷.

Nigeria

In the event of a coup, ECOWAS' constitutional order is restored at the forefront by Nigeria in West Africa. This mainly includes sending the bulk of troops for peacekeeping missions and providing any diplomatic mediation leadership. Through stiff sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military intervention when necessary to reverse coups and reinstate stability, Nigeria has pledged very serious commitment to democratic principles within the framework of ECOWAS⁵⁸.

South Africa

South Africa is one of the leading countries in the African Union, which majors in peacekeeping, mediation, and other diplomatic efforts on the African continent. South Africa, under peaceful conflict resolution, has focused on mediation and dialogue through the AU. The country

⁵⁴ Ngoma, Naison. "Coups and Militarization of Politics in Africa." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, <https://academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR/article-full-text-pdf/87AA83871418>.

⁵⁵ "China and Russia's Role in Fomenting Coups." *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-china-and-russia-have-helped-foment-coups-and-growing-militarization-politics>.

⁵⁶ "Organization of American States." *OAS*, <https://www.oas.org/en/>.

⁵⁷ "Brazilian Condemnation of Attempted Coup in Bolivia." *Brazilian Government*, <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/contact-us/press-area/press-releases/brazilian-condemnation-of-attempted-coup-in-bolivia>.

⁵⁸ "ECOWAS, Nigeria, and Niger Coup Sanctions." *International Crisis Group*, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/niger/ecowas-nigeria-and-niger-coup-sanctions-time-recalibrate>.

further contributes to AU peacekeeping missions and provides training and logistic support to other African countries, drawing from the strength based on moral authority as a state that passed its political crisis through negotiation and reconciliation⁵⁹.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The UNDP works in the area of establishing democratic institutions within nations, with activities related to electoral systems, judicial independence, and civil society. In Liberia, the UNDP strengthened electoral transparency, significantly diminishing the potential for disputes that could then fuel coups. While this work is long-term in nature, its impact is inherently circumscribed by a country's previously established political culture and institutional development⁶⁰.

United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA)

The DPPA⁶¹ provides the UN and its member states with risk assessment and early warning through direct access to field information. This is, however, bound by political limitations at times due to disagreements among member states within the UN on the best course of action. Among recent attempts to enrich the quality and timeliness of information, increased collaboration with regional bodies and civil society has been prominent.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The role of ECOWAS⁶² about coups in West Africa has been that of great responsiveness, often combining diplomatic mediation, economic sanctions, and military intervention. The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provides that a change of government in any member state through unconstitutional means should be rejected under terms that require collective action. Particularly in 2017, the role of ECOWAS was quite instrumental in the return of democratic governance to The Gambia⁶³. Indeed, force, if need be, was proved to be ready for deployment alongside the effort of diplomatic and regional solidarity in securing such a return.

Organization of American States (OAS)

The OAS⁶⁴ is the key regional organization for protecting democracy in the Americas, which is based on the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The typical OAS responses to coups involve diplomatic efforts. That means negotiating the restoration of democracy while applying some

⁵⁹ "South African Statement on the Attempted Coup in the DRC." *DIRCO*, <https://dirco.gov.za/south-african-statement-on-the-attempted-coup-detat-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>.

⁶⁰ "UNDP." *United Nations Development Programme*, <https://www.undp.org/>.

⁶¹ "Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs." *United Nations*, <https://dppa.un.org/en>.

⁶² "ECOWAS." *Economic Community of West African States*, <https://www.ecowas.int/>.

⁶³ "Research on Coups." *JSTOR*, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44982223>.

⁶⁴ "Organization of American States." *OAS*, <https://www.oas.org/en/>.

diplomatic pressure on the coup leaders. Additionally, the OAS opens the path to members imposing sanctions and turns to United Nations action in serious situations.

European Union (EU)

The European Union⁶⁵ responds to coups with the imposition of sanctions and suspension of development aid, which it does hand in hand with the aid for democratic governance. It coordinates with the United Nations and other international bodies and leverages its economic and political might to affect events. It executes selective sanctions, such as asset freezes and travel bans on particular perpetrators, and provides long-term institutional strengthening through funding and technical assistance for elections, governance reforms, and civic society development.

International Monetary Fund and World Bank

The IMF and World Bank⁶⁶ then support the process of post-coup recovery in a country through adjustment of financial support and extension of aid after the re-establishment of legitimate governments. The organizations are known to suspend funding until transitional reforms toward democracy are in place, providing loans and grants for economic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Date	Description of Event
October 24, 1945	The United Nations was officially established after the signing of the UN Charter by 51 countries in San Francisco, aimed at promoting international cooperation and peace
October 24, 1945	As part of the UN Charter, the UNSC was created to maintain international peace and security. It has five permanent members (USA, UK, France, Russia, China) and ten elected members
May 26-27, 1963	The OAU was established in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to promote unity and cooperation among African states. It was replaced by the African Union (AU) in 2001
September 11, 1973	General Augusto Pinochet led a military coup against President Salvador Allende, establishing a military dictatorship
August 1, 1975	The Helsinki Accords were signed by 35 nations, including the US, USSR, and European countries, aiming to improve relations between the Eastern and Western blocs during the Cold War

⁶⁵ "European Union." *European Union*, https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en.

⁶⁶ "IMF and World Bank Factsheet." *International Monetary Fund*, <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2022/IMF-World-Bank-New>.

September 12, 1980	The Turkish military led by General Kenan Evren executed a coup against the government, resulting in a period of martial law
July 26, 2001	The AU was established in Durban, South Africa, replacing the OAU to enhance political and economic integration among African countries
May 22, 2014	The Royal Thai Army led by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha staged a coup against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, establishing military rule
January 1, 2019	The DPPA was created by the UN to advance political solutions to conflicts and support peacebuilding efforts.
February 1, 2021	The military seized control of the Myanmar government, arresting leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and declaring a state of emergency.

UN INVOLVEMENT: RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, TREATIES AND EVENTS

UN Resolutions on Coups d'État

United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 - Haiti

Date: July 31, 1994

Resolution Number: S/RES/940⁶⁷

Overview: Resolution 940 handled the 1991 military coup in Haiti, which toppled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. It authorized a U.S.-led multinational force and was able to restore the democratically elected government in October 1994. Though the resolution succeeded in reinstating Aristide, political instability and economic problems persisted in the country, thus underlining the limitations of foreign military intervention for long-term stability. More importantly, Resolution 940 underscored how post-conflict reconstruction is complex and requires long-term international support.

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1464, 2003, and Resolution 1528, 2004-Côte d'Ivoire

Date: February 4, 2003, and February 27, 2004

Resolution Numbers: S/RES/1464⁶⁸ and S/RES/1528⁶⁹

⁶⁷ "UN Security Council Resolution 940." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F940\(1994\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F940(1994)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁶⁸ "UN Security Council Resolution 1464." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1464\(2003\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1464(2003)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁶⁹ "UN Security Council Resolution 1528." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1528\(2004\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1528(2004)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

Overview: Resolutions 1464 and 1528 were two very important resolutions dealing with the 2002 coup attempt and the eventual civil war in Côte d'Ivoire. Resolution 1464 sanctioned a peacekeeping force for the process of restituting peace, while Resolution 1528 instituted UNOCI for the management of the implementation of peace accords. These actions were steps toward national reconciliation and helped to stabilize the region, even though problems concerning peacekeeping and carrying out elections remained, a fact that projected or put forth the challenging nature of long-term stability to be saved within post-conflict settings.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1542 (2004) - Haiti

Date: April 30, 2004

Resolution Number: S/RES/1542⁷⁰

Overview: Resolution 1542 established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, after President Aristide's departure in the face of an armed rebellion. The mission had the mandate to support political stability, public security, and democratic governance in Haiti. In the process, it played a key role in maintaining order, but the persistence of economic hardships and political unrest in Haiti showed the limitations of peacekeeping efforts in resolving the deeper structural issues. This resolution underlined the need for comprehensive strategies that marry security with development assistance.

UN Security Council Resolutions 2056, 2071, and 2085-Mali

Date: July 5, 2012, October 12, 2012, and December 20, 2012

Resolution Numbers: S/RES/2056⁷¹, S/RES/2071⁷², and S/RES/2085⁷³

Overview: These resolutions focused on the 2012 military coup in Mali and the ensuing security crisis. Resolution 2056, in particular, called for the restoration of constitutional order and humanitarian assistance, while Resolution 2071 set the stage for an international military force to assist Malian authorities. Resolution 2085 provided for AFISMA, the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, to conduct combat operations against the terrorist groups. All the

⁷⁰ "UN Security Council Resolution 1542." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1542\(2004\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F1542(2004)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁷¹ "UN Security Council Resolution 2056." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2056\(2012\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2056(2012)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁷² "UN Security Council Resolution 2071." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2071\(2012\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2071(2012)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁷³ "UN Security Council Resolution 2085." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2085\(2012\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2085(2012)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

resolutions were intended to help stabilize Mali and reestablish state authority, but regional terrorism and political instability persisted as stubborn challenges, illustrating the messiness of complex interventions.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100, 2013-Mali

Date: April 25, 2013

Resolution Number: S/RES/2100⁷⁴

Overview: Resolution 2100 established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to support the stabilization of Mali and restoration of state authority following the coup. These would support political processes, protection of civilians, and promotion of human rights. While MINUSMA contributed to an improvement in the security conditions, continuous threats posed by terrorist groups and political instability were clear pointers to the challenges in long-term peace and security. Hence, it called for a comprehensive strategy that combines military, political, and developmental measures.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2565 (2021) - Myanmar

Date: March 12, 2021

Resolution Number: S/RES/2565⁷⁵

Overview: Resolution 2565 focused on the political and humanitarian crisis that broke out after the military coup by Myanmar on 1 February 2021. It also calls for an immediate end to violence, respect for human rights, protection of all civilians, and access to humanitarian assistance. This was effectively challenged to make a change, for despite international outcry and sanctions, Myanmar's military remained in control. This case shows the role and even powerlessness of the international resolutions in affecting the actions of sovereign states in the absence of united global pressure and will.

Applicable Treaties and Agreements

Charter of the United Nations, 1945⁷⁶

⁷⁴ "UN Security Council Resolution 2100." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2100\(2013\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2100(2013)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁷⁵ "UN Security Council Resolution 2565." *United Nations*, [https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2565\(2021\)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False](https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2565(2021)&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False).

⁷⁶ "United Nations Charter." *United Nations*, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>.

The United Nations Charter is, in fact, the basic treaty that outlines the principles of international relations, which include Article 2(4). Chapter VII vests powers in the Security Council to take measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, enforcement can be seriously problematic, as it frequently is when it involves powerful states offending against its provisions. This lies at the heart of the tension between state sovereignty and collective security.

Relevant Events

Intervention in Haiti, 1994⁷⁷

In 1994, the UN Security Council authorized a multinational force to reestablish Haiti's democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide after a military coup. While Aristide was reinstated, the intervention illustrated the potential of international action on behalf of democracy but left behind long-term political and economic struggles, which pointed out the narrow possibility of reaching permanent stability by the use of military intervention alone—instead, stressing continuous international support and development efforts.

Côte d'Ivoire Conflict and UNOCI, 2002-2017⁷⁸

Following the coup attempt and the consequent civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, the United Nations began the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire to assist the process of peace. It is these national reconciliation, disarmament, and election operations that helped to consolidate the stabilization in the region. At the same time, challenges towards the maintenance of peace or running free elections remain very high, which underlines the complexity of both post-conflict reconstruction and international engagement in a sustained manner.

Mali Crisis (2012-on-going)⁷⁹

The 2012 military coup brought Mali both political instability and a security crisis. The UN Security Council voted several resolutions that eventually gave birth to AFISMA⁸⁰ and then MINUSMA⁸¹ for stabilization in the country. These efforts, while quite firming up the security conditions, underline the continuous dangers from terrorist groups and political instability, therefore stressing that

⁷⁷ "Haiti Invasion and Restoration of Democracy." *Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/haiti#:~:text=The%20invasion%20force%20numbered%20early,mandate>

⁷⁸ "Peacekeeping in Haiti." *International Peace Institute*, <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/1806-Many-Lives-of-a-Peacekeeping-Mission.pdf>.

⁷⁹ "UN Press Release on Mali." *United Nations*, <https://press.un.org/en/2012/sc10698.doc.htm>.

⁸⁰ "AFISMA Progress Report." *African Union*, <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/358th-psc-meeting-progress-report-afisma.pdf>.

⁸¹ "MINUSMA: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali." *United Nations*, <https://minusma.unmissions.org/en#:~:text=from%20northern%20bases>.

long-term peace and security would be hard to achieve without comprehensive and multifaceted intervention.

Myanmar Coup, 2021⁸²

A military coup took place in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, followed by large-scale protests and violence. The UN Security Council condemned the coup and called for an end to violence and respect for human rights. In the face of international outcry, control remained with the Myanmar military, and little in this resolution was able to affect real change. This example brought home once more that international resolutions stand very little chance of influencing the actions of a sovereign state without united global pressure and support.

PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

African Union on the Mauritania Coup, 2008⁸³

Date: 2008-2009

Name: Sanctions and African Union's Diplomatic Efforts

Outline: In response to the Mauritanian coup, which overthrew President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi in 2008, the African Union condemned it the next day and sanctioned the ruling military junta by suspending Mauritania's membership, closing the junta off from the rest of the international community. Several high-level meetings and negotiations were held under the AU's mediation leading to the agreement for new elections in the year 2009. Although the elections finally reinstated a degree of democratic governance, how the coup plotters came to hold huge influence diminished the success of the AU's intervention and then raised questions about the situations of enforcing democratic standards while the military has not lost its power.

Organization of American States and the Honduras Coup, 2009⁸⁴

Date: 2009

Name: OAS Diplomatic Mediation and Sanctions

Outline: In June 2009, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was toppled in a military coup. What followed was a constitutional crisis. The Organization of American States condemned the coup immediately and suspended Honduras from the organization. The OAS also tried to mediate a

⁸² "UN Press Release." *United Nations*, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1146112>.

⁸³ "Press Release on Guinea-Bissau." *United States Department of State*, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/dec/113514.htm>.

⁸⁴ "OAS Press Release." *OAS*, https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-214/09.

resolution with several emergency meetings and diplomatic missions, including the San José-Tegucigalpa Accord, which had proposed Zelaya's reinstatement. Despite these measures, the coup government proceeded to organize controversial elections later that year, bypassing the OAS mediation effort. This case is illustrative of how difficult it is for diplomacy to overcome deep political gaps and how hard international organizations can push their actions in the field of undoing a coup.

Economic Community of West African States in Guinea-Bissau (2012)⁸⁵

Date: 2012

Name: ECOWAS Military and Diplomatic Intervention

Outline: The April 2012 coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau truncated the second round of presidential elections. ECOWAS reacted promptly to forestall further violence and reestablish order with the deployment of a stabilization force, ECOMIB. Negotiations led by ECOWAS resulted in an agreement establishing a transitional government while imposing pressure on coup leaders with sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Although the intervention succeeded in averting large-scale violence and in facilitating a return to civilian rule, Guinea-Bissau's continuing political instability and recurrent coups underlined how limited such interventions might contribute to long-term stability if the inbuilt political and economic issues were not resolved.

United Nations Security Council Debate on Zimbabwe (2008)⁸⁶

Date: 2008

Name: UNSC Debate and International Pressure on Zimbabwe

Outline: In the wake of far-flung violence and electoral irregularities that characterized the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe, there were major international fears that the country was either on the brink of a full-blown military coup or that it was gradually descending into a failed state. The UN Security Council discussed the development and proposed a resolution that would have imposed sanctions on the regime of President Robert Mugabe. But the resolution was vetoed by China and Russia, signifying the geopolitical divide that exists and the limitations of the UNSC with regard to internal political crises. The falling through of this resolution underlined the complexities involved in international intervention within sovereign states, especially when the big powers are divided.

⁸⁵ "ECOWAS, AU, CPLP, and EU Joint Assessment Mission." *African Union*, <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-the-joint-ecowas-au-cplp-eu-un-assessment-mission-to-guinea-bissau>.

⁸⁶ "UN Press Release on Côte d'Ivoire." *United Nations*, <https://press.un.org/en/2008/sc9396.doc.htm>.

Lomé Peace Agreement, Sierra Leone, 1999⁸⁷

Date: 1999

Name: Lomé Peace Agreement and the Role of International Mediation

Outline: The Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 brokered an end to the civil war in Sierra Leone, including elements of coup d'état when military factions and rebel groups seized power. It was mediated by international mediators ably assisted by the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States. It sought to re-integrate combatants into society and provide for a power-sharing government. However, the peace was a null short because fighting broke out again thus unmasking the agreement's inefficiency in disarming rebels and failure to handle the root causes. The case of Niger stands out as one of the many cases that epitomizes the difficulty of achieving sustainable peace using negotiated settlements with unresolved basic tensions.

African Union Peace and Security Council meeting on the Situation in Mali⁸⁸

Date: 2012

Name : Discussions from the Peace and Security Council of the African Union

Outline: In the wake of the 2012 coup in Mali, the African Union's Peace and Security Council convened an extraordinary session to take stock of the situation. The Council, in its aftermath, denounced the coup, suspended Mali's membership, and combined with ECOWAS to ensure the reinstatement of constitutional order in Mali. The AU thus went ahead to support the AFISMA Mission, later sanctioned by the United Nations. Despite these efforts, Mali remains unstable, having recorded subsequent coups in 2020 and 2021. This case also underlines that attaining long-term stability within a country featuring deep political and ethnic fractures is quite challenging, even with the deployment of heavy regional and international support.

European Union's Diplomatic Efforts in Ukraine (2004-2005)⁸⁹

Date: 2004-2005

Name: European Union Mediation during the Orange Revolution

⁸⁷ "Lomé Peace Agreement." *Peace Accords Matrix*, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/lome-peace-agreement>.

⁸⁸ "AU Communiqué on Mali." *African Union*, <https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-1057th-meeting-of-the-psc-held-on-14-january-2012-on-the-situation-in-mali>.

⁸⁹ "European Parliament Press Release." *European Parliament*, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/presse/pr_focus/2005/EN/03A-DV-PRESSE_FCS\(2005\)08-19\(00984\)_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/presse/pr_focus/2005/EN/03A-DV-PRESSE_FCS(2005)08-19(00984)_EN.pdf).

Outline: The Orange Revolution in Ukraine erupted following allegations of electoral fraud during the 2004 presidential election, developing widespread protests, notably with fears of a possible coup. It was hence crucial that the crisis be mediated at the highest levels by the European Union, especially Javier Solana, who facilitated the government-opposition dialogue. These efforts by the EU, aided by domestic and international pressure, ensured that new elections were held peacefully and widely perceived as free and fair. The successful mediation underlined the potential for international diplomatic intervention to head off a slide into violence or unconstitutional change of government.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Coup-Linked Sanction Relief Mechanism

Such mechanisms would tie relief from international economic sanctions to the preservation of democratic governance. The approach enables countries that respect democratic principles and refrain from military coups to gradually achieve the threshold for sanctions relief, thereby fostering stability. This system could involve constant monitoring of governance indicators, technical assistance for countries prone to coups, and making sure the relief provided economically serves as a reward for constitutional order. The system deploys leverage in the economy to prevent military takeovers and ensure democratic stability in the long run.

Blockchain-Based Governance Accountability System

The proposal assumes a blockchain mechanism that would ensure there is a transparent and tamper-proof record of government activities. This will prevent unconstitutional actions, such as coups, from being concealed, since major decisions and transactions would be encoded into a decentralized ledger. In other words, it would mean the government and its structures, including the military, will be more open before the public eye and accountable for their actions. It is such a system that should be introduced in fragile democracies as an internationally overseen attempt at keeping them clean and substantially reducing possibilities for military coups.

Global Crowdsourced Coup Monitoring Network

This network would mobilize civilians, activists, and volunteers to spot and take action on early signs of a coup in real time. It could make use of social media, encrypted

communications, and AI-driven alerts for rapid information sharing, fast international attention, and action against coups. Globally supported institutions would be involved, allowing citizens to act for themselves and amplify real-time global pressure against coups.

Democracy Bonds

Democracy Bonds are a proposed financial instrument to undergird democratic institutions' resilience. The proceeds of the bonds would finance independent media, civil society, and electoral systems. Investors would earn a return based on the absence of a coup in the country or its resolution after a coup, thereby aligning their financial returns with democratic stability. Management of such bonds needs to be done in collaboration with international finance institutions, with national governments, for such a fund to be created for the protection of democratic governance.

Global Whistleblower Protection Program for Military Personnel

The Global Whistleblower Protection Program for Military Personnel shall protect and encourage military personnel to report any plans for a coup or other unconstitutional action. This would involve secure reporting channels, asylum, financial rewards, and legal protection if someone wanted to share such information. The program, under management by the UNSC with contributions from member states, would lessen some of the inherent risks that come with whistleblowing, thereby making it a viable option for those with inside information on a coup attempt. The protection and incentives offered would vastly increase the potential of early warning, allowing for pre-emptive international action against coups.

Strategic Democratic Partnerships

Strategic Democratic Partnerships involve the offering of long-term mentorship, resources, and assistance to countries vulnerable to coups by the stable democracies. These would be institutionalized through bilateral and multilateral agreements focusing on electoral assistance, judicial reform, anti-corruption efforts, and many other concerns. These partnerships would provide for regular exchanges of government officials, technical experts, and civil society leaders to ensure knowledge and best practice transfers. In the process, they would pair vulnerable states with established democracies to make at-risk governments more resilient to military coups and capable of retaining democratic rule.

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